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SAN PEDRO V. UNITED STATES
79 E3d 1065 (11th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Section 9-73.510 of the USAM provides:
Alberto San Pedro, a Cuban citizen and lawful,
permanent resident of the United States since 1956,
was indicted for bribery of a federal public official
and conspiracy to commit bribery.' He entered into
a plea agreement with the United States on the con-
spiracy charge.2 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) filed an order to show cause why he
should not be deported.3 San Pedro petitioned for a
writ of mandamus and a temporary restraining or-
der on the grounds that the deportation hearings
initiated against him violated the plea agreement.
4
He argued that a promise not to deport him was
unequivocally part of the bargain he struck with the
Office of the United States Attorney in Florida.' The
government duly noted that the written agreement
did not refer to the subject of deportation.6 How-
ever, it conceded that the plea agreement provided
complete transactional immunity to San Pedro.
7
Both parties agreed that if a United States at-
torney could promise a criminal defendant non-de-
portation, the authority must lie in §§ 9-16.020
and 9-73.510 of the United States Attorney Manual
(USAM). 8 Section 9-16.020 of the USAM provides:
U.S. Attorneys should also be cognizant of the
sensitive areas where plea agreements involve
either extradition or deportation. No U.S. at-
torney or AUSA has the authority to negotiate
regarding an extradition or deportation order
in connection with any case. If extradition has
been requested or there is reason to believe that
such a request will be made, or if a deportation
action is pending or completed, U.S. Attorneys
or AUSAs, before entering negotiations regard-
ing such matters, must seek specific approval
from the Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-
nal Division.
I San Pedro v. United States, 79 E 3d 1065 (11th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 431 (1996).
2San Pedro, 79 E 3d at 1067.





In a criminal case, the United States Attorney
should not as part of a plea agreement or an
agreement to testify, or for any other reason,
promise an alien that he/she will not be de-
ported, without prior authorization from the
Criminal Division.
The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida maintained that nothing in
the USAM or the Immigration and Nationality Act-
gave a United States Attorney the authority to prom-
ise non-deportation status to a criminal defendant
as part of a plea agreement.'0 The court concluded
that any promise regarding deportation between San
Pedro and the United States Attorney did not bind
the INS." Hence, San Pedro's plea agreement did
not impede the INS deportation proceedings against
him.12The court entered summary judgment for the
government. 3 San Pedro appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit, contending that the government represented
to him that his transactional immunity included a
promise of non-deportation.
II. HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment for the govern-
ment.' 4 The Court of Appeals held that the govern-
ment attorneys who had negotiated the plea agree-
ment lacked the authority to promise him that he
would not be deported. The authority to promise
non-deportation to a criminal defendant during plea
negotiations was vested solely in the Attorney Gen-
eral. In the court's view, §§ 9-16.020 and 73.510 of
the United States Attorney Manual did not consti-
tute a delegation of that authority to United States
and assistant United States attorneys.' s
'Id. at 1070.
9 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988).
"0 San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1067.
"179 R 3d at 1068.
'"1d. at 1067.
'3 Id .




The San Pedro Court began its analysis with a
brief examination of due process considerations in
the context of plea negotiations. The fundamental
fairness doctrine of the Fifth Amendment requires
the government to fulfill a plea agreement when its
promises induce a person to relinquish constitutional
rights.' 6 The court highlighted Justice Marshall's
opinion in Santobello v. New York' 7: '"When a pros-
ecutor breaks the bargain, he undercuts the basis
for the waiver of constitutional rights implicit in the
plea."'8 In Mabry v. Johnson,'9 the Court held that a
guilty plea must stand unless the plea is induced by
misrepresentation, which includes unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises.
20
The Eleventh Circuit highlighted the fact that
San Pedro did not challenge the voluntariness of his
guilty plea, but rather sought to enforce a non-de-
portation promise made during plea negotiations.
2'
It followed the rule enunciated by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Johnson v. Lumpkin22 that the government
must adhere to plea negotiation promises if two
conditions existed : first, the promise had to come
from an authorized agent; and second, the defen-
dant had to rely to his detriment on the promise.24
If both conditions were not satisfied, the agreement
would be unenforceable and the government could
rescind it.2 The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that
a plea agreement must have been valid and binding
before a defendant could plead guilty under the
terms of that agreement.
26
Although the Eleventh Circuit maintained that
it was mindful of the due process concerns involved
in the case, it focused its opinion on the authority of
a United States attorney to make non-deportation
promises during plea negotiations. The court looked
to principles of agency law to determine first,
whether a United States attorney had authority to
'6See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971)
(holding that when a state breached a promise regarding
sentence recommendation, the Court would remand case
to state courts to decide whether specific performance of
the agreement on the guilty plea was required in light of
circumstances presented in the case or whether the peti-
tioner should be granted the opportunity to withdraw his
guilty plea).
P7 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
18Santobello, 404 U.S. at 268.
19Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
20Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509 (citing Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970)).
21 San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1068.
2Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1985).
make non-deportation promises and second,
whether such an agreement would be binding on
other governmental agencies- particularly, on the
INS. The court maintained that principles of estop-
pel and apparent authority would not bind the
United States government to an agreement. 27 In-
stead, a plea agreement would be valid and binding
only if the government agent possessed actual au-
thority to make the promise. Hence, the INS would
not be bound unless the government attorneys had
authority, express or implied, to make the non-de-
portation representation.2'
After the district court issued its decision in San
Pedro, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Thomas v. INS"
that United States attorneys had the authority to
bind the INS to the conditions of a cooperation
agreement, even when the INS was neither informed
of it nor a party to it.30 In Thomas, the alien defen-
dant entered into a cooperation agreement with an
AUSA obligating the government to refrain from
opposing relief from deportation and requiring the
defendant to participate as a government drug in-
formant and as a cooperating witness for two years.
3'
The majority reasoned that United States attorneys'
power to "prosecute for all offenses against the
United States,"32 implied that the government had
discretion to oppose or remain silent on deporta-
tion motions.3 3 The authority to prosecute necessar-
ily signified the power to make any plea agreement
which was incidental to a prosecution.34 The Tho-
mas majority gave three reasons why entering into a
plea agreement with deportation terms was within
a United States attorneys' statutory authority to pros-
ecute. First, deportation was a central issue in crimi-
nal cases involving aliens, and it would be a power-
ful inducement for an alien in plea negotiations.
Second, both parties' attorneys would carefully con-
sider the effect which conviction and sentencing is-
sues might have on deportation when negotiating
13United States v. Kettering, 861 F.2d 675 (1 lth Cir.
1988).
24Kettering, 861 F.2d at 677.
11861 F. 2d at 677.
2 San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1068.
27 79 F 3d at 1068 (citing Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d
1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1994)).
281d. at 1068-69.
29Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1994).
"0Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1335.
3135 F.3d at 1335.
3228 U.S.C. § 547(1) (1994)
33Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1339-40.
3435 E3d at 1339-40.
plea agreements. Third, Congress undoubtedly
meant to imply this grant of authority by situating
United States attorneys and INS officials both within
the Justice Department.
35
Three months after Thomas was decided, the
Eighth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's reason-
ing and upheld the authority of an AUSA to bind
the INS to a plea agreement. In Margalli-Olvera v.
INS,36 the defendant and an AUSA entered into a
plea agreement in which the government would rec-
ommend against deportation if the defendant par-
ticipated in a debriefing.37 Furthermore, the agree-
ment obliged the INS to remain silent regarding
deportation.38 The Eighth Circuit extended the rea-
soning of Thomas by ruling that any promise made
by a United States attorney was binding on all agents
of the federal government.39 The court held that an
AUSA entering into a plea agreement"enters th[at]
agreement on behalf of the United States govern-
ment as a whole."40 The Eighth Circuit went one
step further. It reasoned that any ambiguity about
whether a particular agency was bound by a plea
agreement should be resolved in favor of binding
that agency, absent language in the agreement spe-
cifically limiting the agencies it obligated.41 The
Eighth and Ninth Circuits emphasized that United
States attorneys were high-ranking officials ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Sen-
ate, and that they had broad prosecutorial discre-
tion. The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, rejected the
concept that a government attorney had authority
to bind all government agencies to a plea agreement
solely on the basis of prosecutorial power
42
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Thomas that Congress did not
expressly grant United States attorneys authority to
bind the INS.43 However, the Eleventh Circuit's
agreement with the Ninth Circuit ceased at that
point. In San Pedro, the court noted that the Tho-
mas decision overlooked that the Attorney General
alone had explicit authority to enforce immigration
law. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit "incorrectly harmonized the statutes that
351d. at 1340.
36Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1994).
3743 E3d at 348.
381d. at 348.
39 1d. at 353.
40 1d.
41 Id. at 352.
4 2San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1069.
4379 F3d at 1069.
44 Id.
empower the United States attorneys and the attor-
ney general."44 The court criticized the Ninth Cir-
cuit for failing to explain why Congress might grant
United States attorneys the authority to bind the
INS while concurrently granting the Attorney Gen-
eral the authority to enforce specific provisions of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act.4 The At-
torney General was responsible for carrying out the
mandates of the Immigration Naturalization Act and
could choose to delegate her powers to the INS com-
missioner.46 Her authority included the power to
deport aliens,47 as will as the ability to delegate the
power to institute or terminate deportation hear-
ings at the INS.48 The San Pedro majority responded
that if a United States attorney could obstruct a
deportation proceeding by promising non-deporta-
tion status to a criminal defendant, he would un-
dermine the authority of the INS.49 It found that a
United States attorney could promise a criminal
defendant non-deportation status only if the Attor-
ney General specifically delegated such power to
him. 0 The court further noted that ruling otherwise
would permit a United States attorney's
prosecutorial power to encroach on the Attorney
General's specific power to enforce immigration
law.'
The court interpreted USAM §§ 9-16.020 and
9-73.510, whether read independently or together,
as an ineffective delegation of authority from the
Attorney General to United States attorneys.5" The
court stressed that the USAM was not a source of
law, but only a source of internal guidance for the
Department of Justice which did not have the force
of law. 3 It rejected San Pedro's argument that the
USAM was a source of a government attorney's au-
thority to promise non-deportation, for nothing in
the USAM suggested that it was a delegation of au-
thority from the Attorney General to the United
States attorneys.s4 The majority further declared that
even if the USAM could serve the function of del-
egating the Attorney General's authority to United
States attorneys, the language in USAM § § 9-16.020
and 9-73.510 was deficient to achieve the alleged
45 Id.
46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a-b) (1994).
.
7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
48See 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1995).
49San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1070.





delegation.-" The opinion noted that only a clear and
explicit delegation of authority from the Attorney
General to a United States attorney would allow a
United States attorney to make a deportation prom-
ise during plea negotiations.5 6 Absent an explicit
delegation, INS officials could freely disregard
whether a government attorney promised not to
deport a criminal defendant as a term of a plea agree-
ment when implementing its depbrtation proceed-
ings against that defendant.
5 7
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Thomas rea-
soned that § 9-73.510 of the USAM implied a
United States attorney's authority to promise relief
from deportation as long as the agreement was ap-
proved by the Criminal Division." The San Pedro
court found no evidence that the United States At-
torney made promises to the defendant without this
approval.5 9 The Thomas court noted that the bur-
den of proof fell on the government to show that
one of its agents acted beyond his authority6 and
held that the Attorney General could limit the inci-
dental authority of United States attorneys, which
was set out in the Code of Federal Regulations, if
she so chose.6 Most significantly, its opinion high-
lighted the need for the Department of Justice to
implement procedures which would coordinate
those various subdivisions forced to confront depor-
tation issues.6- However, the court maintained that
55 Id.
161d. See also United States v. Touby, 909 E2d 759,
770 (3d. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Attorney General
must execute an affirmative act in subdelegating his au-
thority).
"7San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1071.
S8 Thoinas, 35 F.3d at 1341.
s San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1071.
60 Thomas, 35 F.3d at 3141. The Thomas majority
wrote in dicta, "We shall not invent an excuse for the gov-
ernment to break its promise. If they have an excuse, let





65San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1072 (Goettel, J., dissenting).
The dissent highlighted facts which the majority's factual
background did not reveal. San Pedro had been recruited
by the government to serve as a government witness in an
extensive political corruption investigation. Although the
district judge ultimately sentenced him to thirty months
in prison, the government described his assistance to the
investigation of Hialeah political corruption as "substan-
tial, truthful and invaluable." 79 F.3d at 1073. San Pedro
was not deported immediately after he made parole be-
such procedures were an administrative concern of
the Attorney General and not the province of the
judicial branch.63 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit
noted that it was not a defense counsel's duty to
ensure that the United States attorney was not "step-
ping on toes in the Immigration and Naturalization
Service."64
IV. THE DISSENT
Senior District Judge Goettel dissented in San
Pedro.6 He criticized the majority's complete disre-
gard of fundamental due process considerations and
its limited focus on United states attorneys' author-
ity.66 Judge Goettel noted that the majority's analy-
sis rendered non- deportation promises unimportant
and unenforceable when the government attorney
lacked the proper authorization to make non-de-
portation promises.' He maintained that attorneys
should not make unauthorized promises. If a defen-
dant alleged the existence of a non-deportation
promise, however, then summary judgement must
be precluded.68 According to the dissent, the criti-
cal issue in the case was due process, and particu-
larly, violations of due process which might arise if
the government reneges on a promise made as part
of a plea agreement.69 If the government made non-
deportation promises, due process required it to live
cause of his cooperation with the government in high pro-
file cases. The plea agreement between the United States
Attorney's office and San Pedro guaranteed that the gov-
ernment would not prosecute him for any other offense
based on evidence revealed in the investigation which had
led to his indictment. Judge Goettel suggested that San
Pedro might have believed reasonably that the phrase*





69 Id. See also Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862
(5th Cir. 1975) (holding that when the Department of
Justice promised the defendant it would use its best ef-
forts to see that she was paroled after serving three years
of a seven year sentence and that she would not be de-
ported to France or Switzerland, the prosecution had a
duty to make a strong presentation to the Department of
State as to the nature of the promises and the dangers to
the accused if the Department of State issued an extradi-
tion order and to advise the Parole Board of the impor-
tant public interest in honoring the plea bargain). This
case was binding legal precedent for the Eleventh Circuit
when it heard San Pedro because decisions of the Fifth
Circuit prior to the Fifth Circuit split on September 30,
1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit.
up to those promises.70 San Pedro was entitled to
relief if a factual determination proved the exist-
ence of a non-deportation promise; for an unful-
filled promise would make the underlying plea in-
voluntary.7' An involuntary plea would be uncon-
stitutional unless the breach was remedied. The two
possible remedies were specific performance of the
agreement or the opportunity to withdraw the guilty
plea.72 Because San Pedro had completed his term
of imprisonment, the withdrawal of a guilty plea
would not have been a suitable remedy. As long as
the court found that a government attorney had, in
fact, made a non-deportation promise, the appro-
priate relief for San Pedro was specific performance
of the plea agreement.
Judge Goettel's dissent agreed with the
majority's determination that the power to promise
non-deportation to a criminal defendant as part of a
plea bargain was vested in the Attorney General.'
3
It also conceded that the Office of the United States
Attorney had no expressed or implied actual author-
ity to promise non-deportation to San Pedro because
only the Attorney General had that authority.74 Thus,
it was unnecessary to follow the reasoning of the
Ninth and Eighth Circuits.75 In essence, Judge
Goettel emphasized the importance of making a
factual determination of deportation promises used
to induce a plea bargain. Even though a complete
70 San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1077. See also Ray D. Gardner,
Note, Due Process and Deportation: A Critical Examina-
tion of the Plenary Power and the Fundamental Fairness
Doctrine, 8 Hastings Const. L.Q., 397 (1981).
7 San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1077.







77Id. at 1072.The dissent noted that Mr. San Pedro's
experience was not an isolated instance of a government's
breach of a plea agreement. See United States v. San Pedro,
781 F. Supp 761, 776 (S.D. Fla. 1991). San Pedro moved
to dismiss an indictment alleging RICO violations on the
grounds that it violated his plea agreement-the same
agreement at issue in this case. The District Court for the
Southern District of Florida granted his motion and found'
that the government breached its duty of good faith and
fair dealing by "setting up" San Pedro in an effort to re-
nege on its immunity promise. San Pedro, 781 F. Supp at
776. The district court admonished the government for
denying San Pedro the benefit of his bargain, declaring
that such governmental conduct was simply unfair and
unacceptable. The district court wrote, "In a day when
the confidence and trust of the American people in their
factual determination might have shown that the
Department of Justice had authorized a United
States attorney to make a non-deportation promise,
Judge Goettel noted, San Pedro would have no way
of discovering that delegation. 76 The dissent con-
cluded that if a non- deportation promise was made
to San Pedro from the United States Attorney's Of-
fice, the government was obligated to adhere to its
promise as a matter of due process."
V. CONCLUSION
San Pedro was denied certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court. The Court decided that the
authority of a United States attorney to bind the
INS to a criminal plea agreement was not a justi-
ciable issue even though three circuits were divided
on the issue. After San Pedro, the issue remains for
the circuits to resolve.78 Hence, due process prin-
ciples, agency authority, and deportation matters in
criminal plea agreements regarding alien defendants
are likely to resurface repeatedly for the Supreme
Court's consideration.
The San Pedro decision highlights the impor-
tance of agency issues in the context of plea nego-
tiations. A plea agreement is a unique contract gov-
erned both by ordinary contract and by due process
considerations. These principles ensure governmen-
government ebbs, it is critical that the United States gov-
ernment keeps its word and live up to its obligations ....
The foundation of the Republic will not crack if the Unites
States fails to put Alberto San Pedro in federal prison. It
will shatter, however, if the American People come to
believe that their government is not to be trusted." Id.
The district court maintained that "a deal is a deal, and
the government's word must be its bond." Id.
78 Several circuits have ruled that a government at-
torney has the authority to bind the INS to non-deporta-
tion promises within a plea agreement. For example, see
Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a cooperation agreement "plainly and unambiguously"
dealt with deportation concerns and expressly bound the
INS); Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a plea agreement mentioning to the"United
States" referred not only to the Office of the United States
Attorney, but also to the United States. government and
its agencies, including the INS). See also Ramallo v. Reno,
931 F. Supp. 884 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that promise of
non-deportation made by an AUSA and an INS attorney
bound the government. Although the court did not de-
finitively choose the Ninth Circuit's ruling over the Elev-
enth Circuit, it mentioned that the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit was more persuasive).
tal integrity and prevent prosecutorial overreaching
during the plea bargaining process. However, recent
circuit court opinions have shifted from an agency
law analysis79 to a due process analysis.
80
The grant of summary judgment to the govern-
ment embarks on setting dangerous, new precedent.
Both United States attorneys and the INS are lo-
cated within the executive branch of government.
Furthermore, both are centralized within the De-
partment of Justice. Yet, the San Pedro decision sug-
gests that the INS can disregard any government
attorney's promise not to deport. If the INS and
other agencies are not required to consider prom-
ises made by a United States Attorney, they can pick
and choose which governmental promises will bind
it.
Although agency authority and due process prin-
ciples are the major issues in this case, governmen-
tal accountability is also an important consideration
in San Pedro. The government should be held ac-
countable to keep the promises it makes. As the court
in United States v. Carters' mentioned, "the honor of
the government, public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice, and the efficient administration of
justice in a federal scheme of government" are at
stake in this case. 2 Clearly, the Attorney General
could authorize the United States Attorney's office
to make such a promise not to deport through her
executive powers.83 A person in San Pedro's posi-
tion would have no reason to question that the
attorney's plea offer was supported by the Attorney
General's authority. Until the Court clarifies the
authority of a United States attorney to make non-
deportation promises in the context of plea agree-
ments, fundamental due process rights may depend
upon the circuit in which a person resides.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Elizabeth Garcia
79See United States v. Thournout, 100 E3d 590 (8th
Cir. 1996); San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065 (11 th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Rourke, 74 F.3d 802 (7th Cir.
1996).
'*See Thomas v. INS, 35 F. 3d 1332 (1994); Margalli-
Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1994).
81United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
82 Carter, 454 F.2d at 428.
3id.
